INVESTIGACION

THE 5 ATTACHMENTS:

**HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, USP AND MEDIATION PROJECTS.txt**

This document outlines the global landscape of legal asset purchasers, distinguishing between traditional litigation funding and outright claim purchase, and identifying firms that acquire legal claims, arbitration awards, or pre-litigation opportunities. It provides a roadmap for monetizing our case by selling or assigning it to specialized firms, which is critical for COCOO’s goal of generating immediate liquidity or transferring litigation risk.

**Extracted Information**: The document identifies key firms like Fortress Investment Group (opportunities@fortress.com), Harbour Litigation Funding (info@harbourlf.com), Certum Group (info@certumgroup.com), and Bench Walk Advisors (info@benchwalk.com) that explicitly offer outright purchase of legal claims, judgments, or awards, providing immediate upfront payments in exchange for assuming litigation risks. Fortress has a dedicated “Legal Assets” unit with over $6.8 billion committed, indicating significant capacity for large-scale claim purchases. Harbour explicitly purchases prospective claims and awards, targeting corporates and insolvency practitioners. Certum acquires litigation-contingent assets, including intellectual property rights, with a minimum financing threshold of $1 million. Bench Walk purchases single awards and insolvency claims. Burford Capital and Omni Bridgeway, while primarily funders, offer monetization solutions that can resemble partial claim sales, with Burford advancing expected entitlements and Omni facilitating large-scale claim portfolio transfers (e.g., Ares Management deal). The document also details pre-litigation investment strategies, such as funding investigations, portfolio financing, and acquiring litigation-dependent assets, which are relevant for developing our case before formal filing. It highlights the secondary market for legal assets, where claims are traded among investors, reinforcing their transferability. Regulatory and ethical considerations, such as disclosure requirements and potential conflicts of interest, are noted as factors affecting claim sales.

**Why Extracted**: This information is vital for monetizing COCOO’s case by identifying potential buyers or investors who can provide immediate liquidity, reducing financial risk while allowing us to pursue the case’s strategic goals. The focus on pre-litigation investment supports funding evidence-gathering efforts, such as economic analyses of market harm, without COCOO bearing the full cost. The firms’ global reach (e.g., Fortress’s 25+ jurisdictions, Harbour’s 13) aligns with our cross-border UK-Spain strategy. Understanding regulatory scrutiny (e.g., UK’s PACCAR ruling) and ethical concerns helps structure a sale or assignment to comply with legal standards, avoiding enforceability issues. The secondary market context suggests our claim could attract institutional investors, increasing its marketability.

**Support for Case**: The document supports assigning or selling the case to firms like Fortress or Harbour, who could fund or purchase our collective action for damages under Articles 101 and 102 TFUE, leveraging their expertise in complex, cross-border disputes. This could yield an upfront payment (potentially £100,000-£500,000 for a class action) while retaining COCOO’s mediation role. Pre-litigation funding from Certum or Burford could cover costs for economic reports or expert witnesses, strengthening our evidence base before filing.

**SEARCHLINK Model.pdf (Pages 1-15)**

This document introduces the COCOO CaseLink Doctrine, detailing intelligence platforms for evidence gathering, case building, and public contract acquisition. It focuses on corporate, financial, legal, regulatory, and procurement databases to identify violations, map corporate networks, and uncover actionable opportunities.

**Extracted Information**: The document lists platforms like OpenCorporates, Companies House, LSE News Explorer, SEC EDGAR, Spanish Registries, Violation Tracker UK, EC Competition Portals, and Find a Tender, with specific search protocols for each. OpenCorporates maps corporate structures across 140 jurisdictions, enabling identification of ICAM’s and CGAE’s financial networks and potential conflicts of interest. Companies House and SEC EDGAR provide financial disclosures and director data for UK/US entities, useful for profiling stakeholders or allies (e.g., LegalTech firms). Violation Tracker UK tracks regulatory penalties, allowing us to identify enforcement gaps in competition law, such as CNMC’s inaction. EC Competition Portals and CURIA provide EU case law and antitrust data, critical for precedent on Articles 101/102 TFUE violations. Find a Tender and Contracts Finder enable monitoring of public contracts, supporting our Unsolicited Proposal (USP) strategy for a digital registration platform. The “Noisefilter” protocol involves weekly monitoring for triggers (e.g., regulatory failures) and cross-referencing with violation data to build cases. The “FOC DAM” principle (Find Other Claimants, Monetize Damages) emphasizes expanding victim classes to increase damages, aligning with our collective action. The “Enforcement Gap” strategy targets regulator failures, such as CNMC’s inaction, to pressure systemic investigations.

**Why Extracted**: These platforms and protocols are essential for digging out evidence to substantiate our claims of anticompetitive practices, ultra vires actions, and state liability. OpenCorporates and Spanish Registries can reveal ICAM’s financial structure, potentially showing the fee’s revenue-generating purpose. Violation Tracker and EC Portals provide data on competition violations, supporting our Article 101/102 claims. CURIA and BAILII offer precedents (e.g., STS 1545/2021) for ultra vires arguments. The procurement portals align with our USP strategy, enabling us to propose a PPP contract to resolve the dispute. The “FOC DAM” principle guides class expansion, increasing damages and leverage. The “Enforcement Gap” strategy strengthens our case against CNMC’s supervisory failure, supporting vicarious liability claims.

**Support for Case**: These tools enable comprehensive evidence collection, such as financial data proving the fee’s disproportionality, regulatory inaction evidence for CNMC liability, and EU precedents for competition law breaches. They support our USP by identifying tender opportunities (e.g., Europa Digital) and profiling competitors, ensuring COCOO’s proposal stands out. The protocols enhance our ability to sell the case by providing a robust evidence dossier, making it attractive to litigation funders or buyers.

**SEARCHLINK Model.pdf (Pages 16-38)**

This section details advanced search protocols and the COCOO Integrated Strategic Model (ISM), providing workflows for case origination, trade barrier disputes, strategic complaints, and public tenders.

**Extracted Information**: The corporate intelligence protocol maps ICAM’s ecosystem, including directors and financial flows, using OpenCorporates and Companies House. The legal research protocol uses BAILII and CURIA for precise precedent searches (e.g., “abuse of a dominant position”), supporting Article 102 claims. The regulatory protocol identifies enforcement gaps via Violation Tracker, targeting CNMC’s failure to investigate ICAM’s practices. The procurement protocol monitors Find a Tender for opportunities to pitch our digital platform USP, analyzing past awards to outmaneuver competitors. The “Noisefilter” playbook identifies case triggers (e.g., CNMC inaction) and qualifies opportunities using “FOC DAM” (expanding to consumers, LegalTech firms) and “PTW” (Political Time Window, e.g., post-election pressure). The “Systemic Trade Barrier” playbook supports cross-border claims by identifying EU market access violations. The “Snowball” playbook uses complaints to trigger broader investigations, positioning COCOO as a mediator. The “Dominating Public Tenders” playbook ensures strategic bidding, leveraging competitor weaknesses (e.g., compliance issues).

**Why Extracted**: These protocols provide actionable steps to gather evidence, such as ICAM’s financial records or CNMC’s enforcement gaps, critical for proving ultra vires and competition violations. The “FOC DAM” and “Snowball” playbooks expand the claimant class and pressure defendants, increasing settlement leverage. The procurement protocol supports our USP, aligning with EU funding goals, and enhances case sale potential by demonstrating COCOO’s strategic value. The “PTW” principle ensures timely interventions, maximizing political pressure on ICAM/CGAE.

**Support for Case**: The protocols enable targeted evidence collection (e.g., ICAM’s revenue from fees via Spanish Registries, CNMC’s inaction via Violation Tracker). The playbooks strengthen our collective action by identifying additional victims (e.g., consumers via higher legal costs) and support UK litigation by leveraging EU precedents. The procurement strategy positions COCOO to secure contracts post-mediation, enhancing monetization. The evidence dossier strengthens the case’s marketability to firms like Fortress or Certum.

**Filings to Search For**

To build our evidence base, I would search for the following filings across the identified platforms:

**OpenCorporates/Spanish Registries**: ICAM’s and CGAE’s financial statements and director appointments to assess fee revenue and potential conflicts of interest. Search for “Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Madrid” and “Consejo General de la Abogacía Española” to map their corporate structure and financial flows.

**Companies House**: UK-based LegalTech firms (e.g., Luminance) or law firms (e.g., DLA Piper) affected by the fee’s market restrictions, using SIC codes 69102 (Solicitors) and 62012 (Business and domestic software development). This identifies allies and quantifies market harm.

**Violation Tracker UK/EC Competition Portals**: CNMC’s enforcement records for professional services (NACE 69.10, 94.12) to document inaction on competition issues. Search for “anticompetitive practices” or “professional associations” to find relevant cases or gaps.

**CURIA/BAILII**: EU and UK precedents on abuse of dominance (Article 102 TFUE), anticompetitive agreements (Article 101 TFUE), and ultra vires actions. Use queries like “abuse of a dominant position” AND “professional association” or “ultra vires” AND “public body” to find cases like STS 1545/2021 or EU equivalents.

**Find a Tender/Contracts Finder**: Past awards for digital transformation or competition consultancy contracts (CPV codes 79411000, 72221000) to profile competitors and tailor our USP. Search for “digital platform” or “competition law consultancy” to identify opportunities.

**LSE News Explorer/SEC EDGAR**: Financial disclosures from affected firms (e.g., Lefebvre, Vlex) mentioning market barriers or reduced growth due to legal service restrictions. Search for “legal services” AND “market access” or “competition barriers” in annual reports.

**Global Trade Alert**: EU-Spain trade barriers affecting UK lawyers, using filters for “harmful measures” and “professional services” to support cross-border claims under Articles 49/56 TFUE.

These filings will provide financial data (e.g., ICAM’s fee revenue), regulatory inaction evidence (e.g., CNMC’s failure), and precedents (e.g., STS 1545/2021), strengthening our claims and making the case attractive for sale or funding.

### Assigning or Selling the Case

To assign or sell the case before legal action, I would target firms identified in the litigation finance document, prioritizing Fortress Investment Group and Harbour Litigation Funding due to their explicit claim purchase offerings and global reach. The process would involve:

**Valuation and Packaging**: Compile an evidence dossier using the CaseLink protocols, including comparative fee data, OECD reports, STS 1545/2021, CNMC correspondence, and prospective economic analysis quantifying market harm (e.g., reduced lawyer mobility, higher consumer costs). Estimate damages at £100,000-£500,000 for COCOO and Oscar Moya, with potential for millions in a class action (thousands of lawyers at 300 euros each, plus lost income).

**Engagement with Buyers**: Contact Fortress (opportunities@fortress.com) and Harbour (info@harbourlf.com) with a pitch emphasizing the case’s strength: clear Article 101/102 TFUE violations, ultra vires precedent, and a large claimant class. Highlight COCOO’s mediation role and USP potential to attract EU funding, increasing the case’s value. Negotiate an upfront payment (e.g., 20-30% of estimated damages, £50,000-£150,000) for partial or full claim assignment, retaining COCOO’s mediation rights.

**Pre-Litigation Funding**: Alternatively, seek funding from Certum or Burford for evidence-gathering (e.g., £20,000-£50,000 for economic analysis), preserving COCOO’s control while reducing costs. Certum’s IP acquisition model could apply if we frame the case as a regulatory asset with enforcement value.

**Due Diligence**: Provide buyers with anonymized claimant data (via our campaign’s confidential registrations), financial analyses, and legal precedents under strict NDAs, addressing regulatory concerns (e.g., PACCAR compliance). Use COCOO’s CaseLink dossier to demonstrate due diligence readiness.

**Secondary Market**: If direct sale is unfeasible, explore secondary market platforms like AxiaFunder to trade claim interests to institutional investors, leveraging the case’s transferability as an asset.

This approach ensures immediate liquidity, mitigates litigation risk, and allows COCOO to focus on mediation and USP opportunities. The evidence dossier, built via CaseLink protocols, enhances the case’s marketability by showcasing its legal and financial merits.

### Mediation Agreement

The following mediation agreement is designed to facilitate a resolution between COCOO, affected lawyers, ICAM, CGAE, and the Spanish State, addressing past harms (fee refunds) and future reforms (digital platform). It positions COCOO as a neutral facilitator, leveraging our case knowledge and aligning with EU modernization goals:
This Mediation Agreement (the “Agreement”) is entered into on June 26, 2025, by and between the Competition \& Consumer Organisation Party (COCOO), a UK-registered non-profit entity (“Mediator”), representing affected lawyers (“Claimants”), and the Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Madrid (ICAM), the Consejo General de la Abogacía Española (CGAE), and the Spanish State through the Ministerio de Justicia (collectively, the “Defendants”). The parties seek to resolve disputes concerning the 300-euro reincorporation fee imposed by ICAM and other bar associations, alleged to be anticompetitive, ultra vires, and disproportionate, through a confidential, non-binding mediation process.

Whereas, COCOO has initiated a campaign alleging that the reincorporation fee violates Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Ley 15/2007, and principles of proportionality, causing financial harm to Claimants and market distortions; \\
Whereas, ICAM and CGAE assert their authority to impose such fees under Ley 2/1974 and the Estatuto General de la Abogacía Española; \\
Whereas, the Spanish State, via the Ministerio de Justicia and CNMC, has supervisory responsibilities over professional associations; \\
Whereas, the parties recognize the mutual benefit of resolving this dispute to avoid costly litigation, reputational harm, and systemic market issues; \\
Whereas, COCOO’s unique expertise in competition law, Spanish administrative law, and digital transformation positions it as a neutral facilitator for a comprehensive resolution.

\section*{Agreement}
\subsection*{1. Mediation Objectives}
The parties agree to mediate in good faith to achieve: (a) redress for Claimants through reimbursement of unlawfully paid fees; (b) reform of the reincorporation process to ensure compliance with Spanish and EU law; (c) development of a digital registration platform to enhance efficiency and transparency.

\subsection*{2. Mediator Role}
COCOO shall serve as the neutral mediator, facilitating confidential discussions, managing information exchange, and proposing solutions based on its proprietary case analysis. COCOO shall not act as a legal representative but as an impartial expert, ensuring fairness and claimant trust.

\subsection*{3. Mediation Process}
\begin{itemize}[noitemsep]
\item \textbf{Initial Agreement}: Within 14 days of signing, the parties shall confirm participation and appoint representatives with decision-making authority.
\item \textbf{Information Exchange}: Within 30 days, Defendants shall provide financial data on fee revenues and administrative costs, under confidentiality agreements. COCOO shall provide an evidence dossier summarizing claimant harms and legal arguments.
\item \textbf{Sessions}: COCOO shall conduct joint and private sessions over 60 days, identifying areas of compromise and testing proposed solutions.
\item \textbf{Settlement Proposal}: COCOO shall draft a proposed Settlement Agreement within 90 days, addressing fee refunds and structural reforms.
\end{itemize}

\subsection*{4. Settlement Terms}
The parties aim to agree on: (a) a formula for refunding fees paid since 2015 (within the statute of limitations), estimated at 300 euros per claimant; (b) abolition or reduction of the reincorporation fee to align with administrative costs (e.g., 30-50 euros, per EU benchmarks); (c) a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) to develop a digital registration platform, potentially funded by EU Europa Digital programs, with COCOO as a consultancy partner; (d) costs of mediation, estimated at £50,000, to be shared equally unless otherwise agreed.

\subsection*{5. Confidentiality}
All communications, documents, and discussions during mediation shall remain confidential, except as required by law or agreed by the parties. No party shall disclose mediation details to third parties without consent, protecting sensitive financial and strategic information.

\subsection*{6. Non-Binding Nature}
This mediation is non-binding until a final Settlement Agreement is signed. Any party may withdraw with 7 days’ written notice, preserving rights to pursue litigation, including UK High Court claims or CNMC investigations.

\subsection*{7. Governing Law}
This Agreement is governed by Spanish law, with disputes arising hereunder subject to the jurisdiction of Madrid courts. EU law principles, including Articles 101 and 102 TFUE, shall guide substantive discussions.

\subsection*{8. Signatures}
The parties, through their authorized representatives, execute this Agreement as of the date first written above.

\vspace{0.5in}
\textbf{For COCOO:} \\
___________________________ \\
Oscar Moya Lledo, Solicitor \\
Date: ______________________

\vspace{0.5in}
\textbf{For ICAM:} \\
___________________________ \\
[Authorized Representative] \\
Date: ______________________

\vspace{0.5in}
\textbf{For CGAE:} \\
___________________________ \\
[Authorized Representative] \\
Date: ______________________

\vspace{0.5in}
\textbf{For the Spanish State:} \\
___________________________ \\
[Authorized Representative, Ministerio de Justicia] \\
Date: ______________________

\end{document}
“`

### Strategic and Monetization Plan Update

**Strengthened Legal Strategy**: The litigation finance document enables us to assign or sell the case to firms like Fortress or Harbour, securing upfront funds (£50,000-£150,000) while retaining mediation rights. The CaseLink protocols enhance evidence collection, providing financial data (Spanish Registries), regulatory inaction proof (Violation Tracker), and precedents (CURIA), strengthening claims for Article 101/102 violations, ultra vires actions, and state liability. The mediation agreement leverages COCOO’s expertise to propose a PPP, aligning with EU funding goals and pressuring defendants to settle.

**Evidence Gathering**: Use OpenCorporates and Spanish Registries to extract ICAM’s fee revenue data, Violation Tracker for CNMC’s enforcement gaps, and CURIA/BAILII for precedents. Commission an economic analysis (£20,000-£50,000) to quantify market harm, funded by Certum or Burford. These filings make the case robust for litigation or sale.

**Monetization**: Sell the case to Fortress or Harbour for an upfront payment, targeting 20-30% of estimated damages (£100,000-£500,000 for COCOO, millions for a class). Alternatively, secure pre-litigation funding to cover evidence costs, preserving control. The mediation agreement could yield a settlement (£200,000-£1 million, including refunds and consultancy fees) and a PPP contract (£500,000-£2 million). My fee remains £200/hour plus 25% contingency on recoveries. Crowdfunding via Change.org/Substack could raise £50,000-£100,000.

**Next Steps**: Contact Fortress and Harbour to pitch case sale, using the CaseLink dossier. File submissions with the Madrid competition authority and a Spanish judicial review petition. Launch the media campaign per the previous artifact. Confirm funding for economic analysis and court fees (£30,000-£70,000) or pursue third-party funding. Provide additional ICAM/CGAE filings to refine evidence searches.

This approach maximizes COCOO’s chances of winning the case, securing financial recovery, and establishing a precedent for professional regulation reform, while leveraging mediation and claim monetization for strategic and financial gain.

 

---

The webpage content:

significantly enhances our strategic approach by articulating a sophisticated, multi-pronged campaign that integrates legal action, public pressure, and mediation to address the 300-euro reincorporation fee imposed by ICAM and other Spanish bar associations. The text introduces a “procurement via pressure” model, where COCOO leverages public and political pressure to position itself as the indispensable provider of solutions, such as a digital registration platform. This approach transforms the case from a mere legal dispute into a broader regulatory reform initiative, aligning with EU modernization goals and potentially attracting EU funding.

The identification of affected industries—LegalTech (NACE J62, J63), Financial Services and Insurance (NACE K64, K65), Consulting and Auditing (NACE M69.2, M70.2), and Real Estate (NACE L68)—expands the scope of harm, demonstrating that the fee’s anticompetitive effects ripple beyond lawyers to broader economic sectors. This strengthens our narrative by framing the issue as a systemic market distortion, appealing to a wider coalition of stakeholders, including LegalTech firms (e.g., Lefebvre, Vlex, Luminance), insurers (e.g., Hiscox, Aon), and real estate companies (e.g., Metrovacesa, Neinor Homes). These entities, while unlikely to have direct legal claims, can amplify our media campaign, increasing pressure on defendants.

The mediation strategy outlined in the text is a game-changer. By positioning COCOO as a neutral facilitator with unparalleled case knowledge, we can pivot from an adversarial role to a constructive one, offering a confidential “safe harbour” for negotiations. The proposal for a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) to develop a digital platform aligns with EU funding opportunities under programs like Europa Digital, making our solution politically and financially attractive to the Spanish government. This approach not only mitigates litigation risks but also positions COCOO for long-term consultancy contracts.

The text’s emphasis on Spanish judicial review mechanisms and Spain’s defensive tactics in international disputes (e.g., Canepa v. Spain) provides critical procedural leverage. The ability to seek precautionary measures to suspend the fee during litigation and extend rulings to non-parties strengthens our collective action strategy. Anticipating Spain’s jurisdictional objections (e.g., intra-EU disputes, shell company claims) allows us to preemptively counter these defenses in UK or EU proceedings.

Finally, the media campaign strategy, leveraging platforms like LinkedIn, X, and Facebook, alongside cost-effective tools like Substack and Change.org, offers a low-cost, high-impact way to mobilize affected lawyers and generate public pressure. This amplifies our legal threat by creating a reputational risk for ICAM, CGAE, and the Spanish State, compelling them toward settlement.

### Findings of Infringement (Allowing a Follow-On Claim)

The following findings of infringement, drawn from the webpage text and case files, establish a basis for a follow-on private action for damages under Spanish and EU competition law:

The 300-euro reincorporation fee imposed by ICAM and other bar associations constitutes an abuse of a dominant position under Article 2 of Ley 15/2007 and Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE). The fee creates an artificial barrier to entry, restricting lawyers’ ability to re-enter the market and limiting professional mobility, which harms competition in the legal services market. The fee’s lack of proportionality to administrative costs and its standardized application across all reincorporating lawyers indicate an exploitative abuse by entities with a state-sanctioned monopoly.

The fee structure may violate Article 1 of Ley 15/2007 and Article 101 TFUE by forming an anticompetitive agreement or decision by an association of undertakings. As professional associations, ICAM and others act as “associations of undertakings” when setting fees that restrict competition, as confirmed by the OECD report’s classification of such bodies under EU competition law. The uniform fee suggests a coordinated practice that distorts market access without objective justification.

The imposition of the fee is ultra vires, exceeding the delegated authority of bar associations under Ley 2/1974 and the Estatuto General de la Abogacía Española (Real Decreto 135/2021). The Spanish Supreme Court’s ruling in STS 1545/2021, cited in the case files, nullified professional regulations exceeding legal limits, supporting the claim that the fee lacks a basis in administrative necessity and serves as a revenue-generating mechanism.

The fee violates the principle of proportionality under Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union and Article 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution. The webpage text and OECD report highlight that the fee, significantly higher than comparable fees in France, Germany, and the UK (30-50 euros), is disproportionate to administrative costs and deters lawyers, particularly those with fewer resources, from re-entering the profession.

The Spanish State and CNMC are vicariously liable for failing to supervise the bar associations’ anticompetitive practices. The OECD report and Canepa v. Spain case establish that states can be liable for delegating regulatory powers without adequate oversight, as per EU law. The CNMC’s inaction (noted in COCOO’s March 8, 2025, letters) and transfer of the case to regional authorities suggest a failure to address a clear competition issue.

The fee structure constitutes unjust enrichment, as bar associations profit from a levy without providing commensurate services. The webpage text’s reference to economic duress and the quasi-contractual nature of the lawyer-bar relationship supports a claim that fees paid under coercion are recoverable.

These findings, particularly the breaches of Articles 101 and 102 TFUE, enable a follow-on claim for damages once a competition authority (e.g., CNMC or Madrid regional authority) confirms the infringement, as per the EU Damages Directive (transposed in UK law).

### Possible Causes of Action

Based on the infringements, the following causes of action are viable in Spanish, UK, or EU jurisdictions:

**Tort – Economic Duress**: The mandatory 300-euro fee, imposed as a precondition to practice, constitutes economic duress under UK tort law. Lawyers have no practical choice but to pay, resulting in financial harm. This claim, supported by the webpage’s reference to coercive contracts, seeks damages for fees paid and lost income due to restricted market access.

**Tort – Misrepresentation by Omission**: ICAM’s failure to justify the fee’s proportionality implies it is a legitimate administrative cost, misleading lawyers. This tort, noted in the webpage, supports damages for fees paid under false pretenses.

**Tort – Vicarious Liability of the Spanish State**: The State’s failure to oversee ICAM’s ultra vires actions, as delegated under Ley 2/1974, renders it liable for damages caused by anticompetitive practices, as per the OECD report and Canepa v. Spain. This claim targets the Ministerio de Justicia and CNMC for supervisory negligence.

**Tort – Misfeasance in Public Office**: The CNMC’s inaction despite COCOO’s February 24, 2025, complaint may constitute a deliberate or reckless failure to fulfill its competition oversight duties, causing harm to affected lawyers.

**Contract – Unjust Enrichment**: The fee, lacking a legitimate basis, enriches ICAM at lawyers’ expense. The webpage’s quasi-contractual analysis supports a restitution claim for all fees paid, potentially extended to a class of affected lawyers.

**Contract – Unconscionable Contract Terms**: The fee’s imposition within a non-negotiable membership agreement is an abusive term under UK’s Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA) or equivalent Spanish consumer protection laws, rendering it voidable and supporting restitution.

**Competition Law – Private Damages Action (Follow-On)**: Post-infringement confirmation by a competition authority, a private action under Ley 15/2007 or the EU Damages Directive seeks damages for financial losses and market exclusion caused by violations of Articles 101 and 102 TFUE.

**Competition Law – Injunction**: An injunction to suspend the fee’s collection, supported by the Spanish judicial review mechanism allowing precautionary measures, prevents further harm pending litigation.

**Spanish Administrative Law – Responsabilidad Patrimonial**: The State’s failure to prevent ICAM’s ultra vires actions triggers liability for damages under Spain’s responsabilidad patrimonial doctrine, as extracted from the webpage’s legal framework.

**EU Law – Breach of Fundamental Freedoms**: The fee restricts freedom of establishment and services (Articles 49 and 56 TFUE), supporting a claim in UK or EU courts for damages and injunctive relief.

### List of Evidence, Sources, and Types

**Comparative Fee Data**: Evidence showing reincorporation fees in France, Germany, and the UK (30-50 euros) versus Spain’s 300 euros. Source: COCOO’s submissions to CNMC, Ministerio de Justicia, and CGAE (e.g., CNMC2ICAM.pdf, cocoo icam minjust.docx). Type: Statistical evidence, demonstrating disproportionality and competitive harm.

**OECD Reports**: Statements that professional regulations often serve incumbent interests, create cartel-like effects, and that states are liable for inadequate oversight. Source: OECD.legalprofession.clp.PDF (pages 1, 2, 4, 9). Type: Expert report, providing authoritative support for anticompetitive and ultra vires claims.

**Spanish Supreme Court Ruling (STS 1545/2021)**: Nullification of professional regulations exceeding legal authority. Source: Cited in cocoo icam minjust.docx and cocoo icam cgae.docx. Type: Legal precedent, supporting the ultra vires argument.

**CNMC Correspondence**: CNMC’s transfer of the case to the Madrid regional authority, indicating jurisdictional acknowledgment but potential inaction. Source: icam.300.reincorp.CNMC.envia.a.CAM.pdf. Type: Official correspondence, evidencing regulatory response (or lack thereof).

**COCOO’s Complaint and Follow-Ups**: Detailed allegations of anticompetitive practices, ultra vires actions, and proportionality violations. Source: CNMC2ICAM.pdf, cgae 2_250325.pdf, cocoo icam minjust.docx. Type: Documentary evidence, establishing the basis for claims and notice to defendants.

**Economic Impact Analysis (Prospective)**: Data on reduced lawyer mobility and higher legal service costs due to the fee, to be commissioned by COCOO. Source: Webpage text referencing LegalTech, insurance, and real estate sectors. Type: Economic analysis, quantifying market distortion (to be developed).

**Spanish Judicial Review Mechanisms**: Provisions for suspending ultra vires acts and extending rulings to non-parties. Source: Webpage text on Spanish JR. Type: Legal framework, supporting injunctive relief and class-wide remedies.

**Canepa v. Spain Arbitration**: Spain’s jurisdictional defenses and tribunal rejection, showing weak defenses in cross-border disputes. Source: Webpage text referencing Canepa case. Type: Legal precedent, guiding UK litigation strategy.

**EU Tender Criteria**: Emphasis on competition law expertise and economic analysis in DG COMP contracts. Source: Webpage text on EU licitations. Type: Procurement framework, validating COCOO’s expertise and mediation proposal.

**Affected Industry Statements (Prospective)**: Testimonials from LegalTech firms (e.g., Lefebvre, Vlex), insurers (e.g., Aon), and real estate companies (e.g., Metrovacesa) on market harm. Source: Webpage text identifying affected sectors. Type: Testimonial evidence, to be gathered via campaign outreach.

### Strategic and Monetization Plan

These findings and causes of action strengthen our legal strategy by providing a multi-jurisdictional approach (Spain, UK, EU) and a robust evidence base. The OECD report and comparative fee data are particularly compelling for proving anticompetitive harm, while the ultra vires argument, backed by STS 1545/2021, targets ICAM’s legal authority. The Spanish judicial review mechanisms and Canepa case insights enable preemptive countering of defenses, enhancing our UK litigation prospects.

**Legal Strategy**: I would file a follow-on damages claim in the UK High Court or Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) post-CNNC or Madrid authority ruling, leveraging Articles 101 and 102 TFUE and UK tort law (economic duress, unjust enrichment). Concurrently, I would seek a Spanish administrative court injunction to suspend the fee, citing judicial review powers. A parallel claim against the State for responsabilidad patrimonial would pressure the Ministerio de Justicia. The collective action, supported by the webpage’s class-building strategy, would consolidate affected lawyers, amplifying damages.

**Mediation Leverage**: The mediation proposal, backed by the PPP digital platform concept, offers a constructive alternative to litigation. I would pitch this to ICAM, CGAE, and the Ministerio de Justicia, emphasizing EU funding opportunities and the risk of a class-wide ruling extending to all affected lawyers. The webpage’s “bridge of trust” concept positions COCOO as the ideal mediator, with unique case knowledge.

**Monetization**: For my services, I maintain the hybrid fee structure: £200/hour plus a 25% contingency on damages/settlements. For COCOO, damages could include refunds of fees paid (300 euros per lawyer, potentially millions for a class of thousands), lost income (estimated £10,000-£50,000 per lawyer), and exemplary damages (£100,000-£500,000). A settlement could yield £200,000-£1 million, including fee refunds and reform commitments. Crowdfunding via Change.org and Substack subscriptions could raise £50,000-£100,000. Winning a small-scale procurement contract (e.g., £15,000 feasibility study) could lead to a larger PPP contract (£500,000-£2 million), with COCOO earning consultancy fees (10-20% of contract value).

**Next Steps**: I recommend launching the media campaign across LinkedIn, X, and Facebook to recruit class members and pressure defendants. Simultaneously, file a detailed submission with the Madrid competition authority and a judicial review petition in Spain. Prepare the UK claim, focusing on tort and competition law, and draft the mediation USP for submission to all parties. Please confirm funding for economic analysis (£10,000-£20,000) and court fees (£20,000-£50,000), or I can explore third-party litigation funding. Provide any additional CNMC or ICAM correspondence to refine the approach.

# Media Campaign Plan for Caso Sostenibilidad

## Objective
Mobilize affected lawyers, pressure ICAM, CGAE, and the Spanish State, and position COCOO as the mediator and reform leader for the 300-euro reincorporation fee issue.

## Platforms and Strategies

### LinkedIn
Target lawyers in Spain and UK-based solicitors with Spanish law interests using free advanced search filters. Join EU competition law and Spanish legal professional groups. Share white papers on fee illegality, directing to a secure COCOO website landing page for confidential claim registration. Launch a paid campaign via LinkedIn Campaign Manager (https://www.linkedin.com/campaignmanager/) with a £500 budget, leveraging introductory credits if available. Use Hunter.io or Apollo.io for cost-effective email outreach.

### X Platform
Create public pressure with concise, data-driven content. Develop infographics comparing Spain’s 300-euro fee to 30-50 euros in France, Germany, UK. Tag legal journalists, EU officials, and ICAM/Ministerio de Justicia accounts. Use hashtags #ICAMAbuso and #CompetenciaParaTodos. Run polls to engage users (e.g., “Should professional bodies charge fees that restrict competition?”). Boost content via X Ads (https://ads.twitter.com/) with a £300 budget, utilizing promotional offers.

### Meta (Facebook)
Build a private, invitation-only group for affected lawyers to share experiences and receive updates. Use targeted ads to reach professionals listing “Abogado” or Spanish law school affiliations, managed via https://www.facebook.com/business/. Allocate £200 for ads to ensure granular targeting.

### Substack
Establish a free newsletter for detailed legal updates and calls to action, bypassing social media algorithms. Aim for 1,000 subscribers within three months to build a direct audience.

### Change.org
Launch a petition demanding fee abolition and refunds, serving as a public anchor for media attention and class recruitment. Share across all platforms to capture support.

## Narrative
Frame the fee as an anticompetitive, ultra vires barrier harming lawyers and consumers, contrasting with EU modernization goals (e.g., Recovery and Resilience Facility). Position COCOO as championing progress against archaic protectionism.

## Budget
Total: £1,000 (LinkedIn: £500, X: £300, Facebook: £200). Supplement with free tools (Substack, Change.org) to maximize reach.

## Timeline
Week 1: Launch LinkedIn and X campaigns, create Facebook group, start Substack. Week 2: Initiate Change.org petition. Weeks 3-12: Amplify content, recruit class members, monitor engagement.

## Deliverables
White papers, infographics, petition, private group, newsletter. Target: 500 lawyer registrations, 10,000 petition signatures, media coverage in legal and EU outlets.

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The core issue is the 300-euro reincorporation fee imposed by ICAM for lawyers seeking to rejoin as practicing members. COCOO argues this fee constitutes an artificial barrier to entry, restricts competition, exceeds ICAM’s delegated authority, and violates proportionality principles under Spanish and EU law. The case files reveal a multi-pronged approach by COCOO, engaging the CNMC, Ministerio de Justicia, and CGAE, with a clear intent to escalate to litigation if necessary, potentially in UK courts.

The CNMC’s response indicates that the matter has been transferred to the Madrid Autonomous Community’s competition authority, as the alleged conduct is deemed to affect only the regional market. This jurisdictional shift suggests a potential challenge in framing the issue as having a supra-autonomous or EU-wide impact, which would bring it back under CNMC or EU competition law scrutiny. However, COCOO’s submissions to the Ministerio de Justicia and CGAE emphasize broader implications, including cross-border effects on UK-based entities and professionals, which could justify invoking EU law, particularly Articles 101 and 102 of the TFUE.

COCOO’s legal arguments are robustly grounded in Spanish law (Ley 15/2007, Ley 2/1974, and the Estatuto General de la Abogacía Española), EU competition law, and international precedents from the OECD and Australian competition frameworks. The OECD reports provide compelling evidence that excessive regulatory barriers in legal professions often serve incumbent interests over public welfare, aligning with COCOO’s claim that the fee protects established lawyers at the expense of new entrants. The reference to the Spanish Supreme Court’s STS 1545/2021 ruling, which nullified overreaching professional regulations, strengthens the ultra vires argument.

A key strength is COCOO’s dual standing: as a UK-registered entity advocating for competition and consumer welfare, and through Oscar A. Moya Lledo’s personal stake as a solicitor affected by the fee. This dual capacity enhances legitimacy to pursue claims both as a public interest organization and as a directly harmed party. The CGAE’s response questioning Oscar’s jurisdiction to act in Spain is effectively countered in COCOO’s March 25, 2025, letter, which clarifies his role as a UK solicitor acting under UK law, not Spanish courts, and leverages UK tort and competition law doctrines.

However, weaknesses exist. The CNMC’s transfer to regional authorities may delay or fragment the case, requiring engagement with a less resourced body. The lack of a CNMC response to COCOO’s initial complaint (as of March 8, 2025) suggests potential administrative inertia or skepticism about the claim’s merit. Additionally, proving the fee’s anticompetitive effect requires evidence of market distortion, such as reduced lawyer mobility or higher legal service costs, which COCOO’s submissions reference but do not fully substantiate with data. The comparative fee analysis (30-50 euros in France, Germany, UK) is persuasive but needs economic analysis to demonstrate consumer harm.

The CGAE’s dismissive stance and the Ministerio de Justicia’s silence (based on the provided documents) indicate resistance from key stakeholders, potentially necessitating litigation to force action. COCOO’s threat to pursue UK High Court proceedings introduces a novel but complex strategy, relying on cross-border tort claims and EU law principles enforceable in UK courts post-Brexit. This approach, while innovative, faces hurdles in establishing jurisdiction and proving damages.

### Strategic Plan to Win the Case

To succeed, I would pursue a dual-track strategy: exhausting administrative remedies in Spain to build a record for litigation while preparing a parallel UK-based tort and competition claim to pressure Spanish authorities and secure financial remedies for COCOO.

In Spain, I would engage the Madrid Autonomous Community’s competition authority, to which the CNMC transferred the case, by submitting a detailed dossier reinforcing the anticompetitive and ultra vires claims. This dossier would include a quantitative analysis comparing the 300-euro fee to administrative costs (e.g., ICAM’s processing expenses) and market data showing reduced lawyer reincorporation rates or increased legal service costs in Madrid. I would request a formal investigation and, if denied, appeal to the CNMC or Spanish administrative courts, citing the CNMC’s obligation to oversee competition issues with potential EU implications.

Concurrently, I would escalate engagement with the Ministerio de Justicia, emphasizing its supervisory role over professional colleges under Ley 2/1974. A follow-up letter would demand a response to COCOO’s March 8, 2025, request, threatening judicial review in Spanish courts for administrative inaction. I would also press the CGAE to investigate ICAM’s practices, leveraging its supervisory authority and citing OECD recommendations for independent oversight of professional bodies.

For the UK litigation track, I would prepare a High Court claim under tort and competition law, alleging that ICAM’s fee constitutes economic duress, unjust enrichment, and a breach of EU competition law (Articles 101 and 102 TFUE, enforceable in UK courts via retained EU law). The claim would name ICAM, the CNMC (for regulatory omission), and potentially the Spanish State (under vicarious liability for delegating unchecked powers to ICAM). Jurisdiction would be established via Oscar’s direct harm as a UK solicitor and COCOO’s status as a UK entity affected by cross-border market distortions. I would seek damages for Oscar’s fee payment, lost income from restricted market access, and exemplary damages for COCOO’s public interest advocacy.

To strengthen the UK claim, I would request disclosure orders for ICAM’s financial records (to prove the fee exceeds administrative costs) and CNMC’s investigation files, invoking the EU Damages Directive’s transposition in UK law. I would also commission an economic expert report to quantify market harm, drawing on OECD methodologies from the provided reports. Precedents like Lungowe v Vedanta and Google v Lloyd support broad standing for public interest claims, bolstering COCOO’s position.

To pressure ICAM and Spanish authorities, I would launch a public advocacy campaign, leveraging COCOO’s UK platform to highlight the case on social media (including X) and engage EU competition bodies like the European Commission. This could prompt informal EU intervention, increasing pressure on Spain to reform ICAM’s practices.

### Monetization Strategy

As COCOO’s solicitor, my financial interest aligns with maximizing recovery for COCOO while ensuring fair compensation for my services. Here’s how I would approach monetization:

For my services, I propose a hybrid fee structure: a reduced hourly rate (e.g., £200/hour, below standard UK solicitor rates) to cover ongoing work, combined with a contingency fee of 25% of any damages or settlements recovered. This balances COCOO’s cash flow constraints with my incentive to win substantial remedies. Alternatively, if COCOO prefers predictability, I could offer a fixed fee (e.g., £50,000) for the Spanish administrative phase and UK litigation preparation, with a success bonus (e.g., £20,000) for favorable outcomes like fee abolition or damages.

To generate revenue for COCOO, I would pursue multiple recovery streams. First, the UK litigation could yield significant damages: Oscar’s direct harm (300 euros plus lost income, potentially £10,000-£50,000) and COCOO’s exemplary damages for market distortion (potentially £100,000-£500,000, depending on court discretion). A class action-style claim, representing other affected lawyers, could increase damages exponentially, with COCOO taking a 10-20% administrative fee from collective recoveries.

Second, I would negotiate settlements with ICAM or the Spanish State to avoid protracted litigation. A settlement could include fee abolition, refunds for past payees (potentially millions if applied nationwide), and a payment to COCOO for legal costs and public interest work (e.g., £200,000). My contingency fee would apply to such settlements.

Third, COCOO could monetize its advocacy by crowdfunding the case, soliciting donations from affected lawyers and competition advocates via platforms like GoFundMe or X campaigns. This could raise £10,000-£50,000, offsetting legal costs and enhancing COCOO’s public profile for future cases.

Finally, success in this case could position COCOO as a leading voice in professional regulation reform, attracting consultancy contracts from EU or UK bodies to advise on competition policy. I would assist COCOO in pitching such services, potentially earning a commission (e.g., 10%) on contracts secured.

### Limitations and Clarifications

I lack direct access to real-time CNMC or Madrid competition authority databases, so I cannot confirm the current status of the transferred investigation. If COCOO has additional correspondence or case reference numbers, please provide them to refine my strategy. Similarly, I cannot access ICAM’s internal financial data without court-ordered disclosure, so economic analysis may require assumptions until evidence is obtained.

I assume COCOO seeks both injunctive relief (fee abolition) and damages, but if priorities differ (e.g., focusing solely on policy change), please clarify. For UK litigation, I need confirmation of COCOO’s funding capacity for court fees and expert reports (estimated £20,000-£50,000). If funding is limited, I can explore legal aid or third-party litigation funding, which I would negotiate on COCOO’s behalf.

### Next Steps

I recommend immediate action to file a submission with the Madrid competition authority, draft a follow-up letter to the Ministerio de Justicia, and begin preparing the UK High Court claim. Concurrently, I would initiate the economic analysis and public advocacy campaign. Please confirm your preferred fee structure, funding availability, and any additional documents or priorities to proceed.

By blending aggressive litigation, strategic advocacy, and creative monetization, I am confident we can win this case, secure substantial remedies for COCOO, and establish a precedent for fairer professional regulation in Spain and beyond.

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Having analyzed the attached files, it’s clear they provide the strategic framework—the “how”—that complements the “who” and “what” we have already identified. These documents articulate our core methodologies and allow us to refine the approach for each of our three key projects, intertwining our actions with the industry sectors central to the Caso Sostenibilidad.

The files codify our operational strategy, which is essentially a form of regulatory entrepreneurship. This approach is designed to proactively reshape the market for professional services, specifically targeting the activities of professional membership organisations (NACE 94.12) and their control over the legal activities market (NACE 69.10). Our own operational codes in management consultancy (SIC 70229) and investigation (SIC 80300) are the classifications for the very services we deploy to achieve this reform.

For our media campaign, the strategies outlined provide a clear “pincer movement” approach. We will combine data-driven advocacy, using the stark comparison between the €300 fee in Spain and the much lower fees elsewhere, with a narrative focused on public interest litigation. This allows us to attack the issue on two fronts: one logical and evidence-based, appealing to regulators and professional bodies, and one ethical and justice-oriented, designed to mobilize public opinion and garner media attention. This dual approach will frame the bar associations’ conduct not as a simple fee dispute, but as an abuse of delegated public power that harms both consumers and the legal profession itself.

For our unsolicited proposals to public bodies and private companies, the concept of creating public-private partnerships is paramount. Our proposal will not merely identify the problem but will offer a concrete, collaborative solution. We can approach the Spanish Ministry of Justice, as well as the major law firms we previously identified like Garrigues or Cuatrecasas, with a turnkey proposal to develop a modern, cost-effective digital platform for professional registration. This USP would be positioned as a way to enhance efficiency, ensure compliance with EU principles, and demonstrate a commitment to innovation, directly engaging our expertise in management consultancy to solve a problem within the legal activities sector.

In our mediation efforts, these strategic documents give us a significant edge. The concept of focusing on a “choke point” is our guiding principle; in mediation, that choke point is the indefensible nature of the €300 re-registration fee. By concentrating all pressure on this single issue, we prevent the opposing party from diluting the conversation with unrelated matters. We can propose a multi-stakeholder dialogue, inviting not just the bar association but also representatives from consumer groups and the large law firms who are harmed by these fees. Our leverage in these talks comes from the credible threat of our other projects: a sophisticated media campaign and a well-prepared public interest lawsuit. We can make it clear that a negotiated, comprehensive settlement is the most efficient and least damaging path for them, offering them a collaborative way out of a problem that will otherwise escalate significantly.

Based on an analysis of the perpetrators’ activities and our own operational focus, the key sectors for identifying potential competitors and collaborators fall under specific European (NACE) and UK (SIC) industrial classification codes. The Spanish bar associations’ core functions are classified under NACE 69.10 for Legal Activities and NACE 94.12 for Activities of professional membership organisations. Our own work at COCOO aligns with SIC 70229 for Management consultancy activities and SIC 80300 for Investigation activities. These classifications help us pinpoint the exact markets and players relevant to our campaign.

In the legal sector (NACE 69.10), the primary business users and consumers harmed by the bar associations’ restrictive practices are the law firms and individual lawyers themselves. They are a crucial audience for collaboration. In the UK, major firms in this space include DLA Piper (info@dlapiper.com), Clifford Chance (info@cliffordchance.com), and Allen & Overy (information@allenovery.com). Their Spanish counterparts, who are directly impacted, include firms like Garrigues (comunicaciones@garrigues.com), Cuatrecasas (whose partner Elena Cuatrecasas can be reached at elena.cuatrecasas@cuatrecasas.com), and Uría Menéndez (madrid@uria.com). These firms represent a significant pool of potential allies whose business is directly affected by the fee structures we are challenging.

In the overlapping sectors of management consultancy and investigation (SIC 70229 & 80300), we find both competitors to COCOO’s advisory work and potential expert partners for our investigative efforts. These firms possess deep expertise in corporate intelligence, forensic accounting, and strategic advisory. In the UK, key players include the major consulting firms like Deloitte (deloittelegal@deloitte.co.uk) and PwC (whose support address is GBL_compendia-support@pwc.com). Specialized investigation and advisory services are offered by firms such as Grant Thornton, whose enquiries can be directed to website.enquiries.London@uk.gt.com. In Spain, global firms like Alvarez & Marsal maintain a significant presence (contactable via their Madrid office at +34 91 781 5521). These companies could be engaged as expert witnesses or partners in building the economic case against the anticompetitive practices.

Finally, in the sector of professional membership organisations (NACE 94.12), we find potential models for good governance and collaborators for advocating reform. These bodies are not direct competitors but represent how professional standards can be maintained without resorting to the restrictive practices we have uncovered. Leading UK examples include the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) (employers@accaglobal.com), the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) (cima.contact@aicpa-cima.com), and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) (generalenquiries@icaew.com). Engaging with these organisations could provide valuable insight and add weight to our proposals for a more transparent and competitive regulatory regime in Spain.